Eataly: the losses incurred by the Fico Eataly World food park and the ‘simplified procedure’ loan

Written on 4 August 2020, updated on 25 August 2026

I am using this article to describe, including via all the linked pages, the story of Eataly, which had greatly fascinated me when it first began.

Back in 2007, in Turin, I met Oscar Farinetti (1), who offered me the chance to become a partner in his business. I turned it down, partly because, at the time, I didn’t have the means to buy the shares he was offering me.

Regarding Eataly’s operations , on 4 August 2020 I wrote:

A) “Fico Eataly World is a splendid idea realised in the wrong city: Bologna is not a city of art and lies off the beaten track of major tourist routes.

However, building it elsewhere would have entailed excessive construction costs, whereas the current site was provided free of charge by the City of Bologna.

Fico (26 shareholders, including Eataly and Coop Alleanza 3.0): visitor numbers stood at 1.6 million, compared with the 4 million forecast (2).

Revenue slipped below 40 million, EBITDA was negative by 4.3 million and the net loss stood at 3.1 million.

“It is not a dramatic loss, but the problem lies in the medium- to long-term sustainability of the world’s largest food park (opened in November 2017)” (Aziende in Campo).

B) Eataly, whose revenue rose to 527 million in 2019 (up 7 per cent (3)), applied for – and was granted, via a simplified procedure – a loan of 105 million, 90 per cent of which was guaranteed by SACE (source: Corriere Economia, 3 August 2020).

45 per cent of Eataly’s revenue comes from the US (4), and its e-commerce operations were scaled up during the coronavirus lockdown.

Conclusion: I have always maintained that the company should not have set up in Italy but only abroad. I saythis all the more so because I was the ‘architect’ of a similar concept, which, in Milan, Genoa and Brescia, did not work (QB Mercato e Cucina).

That said, how many companies in Italy have been given premises rent-free and received loans totalling over €100 million via a ‘streamlined procedure’?

The Corriere also states that Eataly was ‘among the first’ to access this scheme.

And I found myself wondering: will these ‘fast-track arrangements’ – along with the new openings – be enough to save Eataly from the coronavirus?

On 14 August 2022, I added my own response: “judging by the current results, it would seem not” (Fico, losses of three million euros).

The market’s final answer to my question came a month later, on 20 September 2022, with the sale of the controlling stake in Farinetti’s company (Read: Eataly: agreement with Investindustrial, the largest shareholder with a 52 per cent stake, and Eataly: losses of 31 million, debt of 200 million against a turnover of 464 million euros).

What has Eataly been lacking all these years? Certainly, as I mentioned regarding Autogrill, a strong private label that would promote ‘Made in Italy’ abroad ,because the big brands did well there initially but then, probably, became too recognisable and comparable to what traditional supermarkets offer. It therefore became difficult to differentiate the products of a chain that had aspired to be premium.

Incidentally, for Autogrill, products have always been an ‘afterthought’ (with a large focus on catering, and products serving only as a complement), whereas for Eataly, they were meant to represent, alongside catering, the core business.

But whilst Oscar Farinetti, as Mario Gasbarrino puts it, was “a beacon”, the chain – as well as having an “Italian problem” – needed to evolve.

On this subject, see also: some thoughts on the food offerings at La Rinascente, Coin, Eataly, Grande Epicerie, El Corte Inglés and Harrods (5).

P.S.: The Corriere of 23 September 2022 reports: “The 200 million capital increase subscribed by Investindustrial will serve, on the one hand, to substantially reduce net debt to zero (though the debt owed to Sace (6) will be retained), and, on the other, to acquire the 40 per cent stake in Eataly USA held by the Bastianich and Saper families….”.

And an even more bitter ending looms for FICO, as Stefano Cigarini, the CEO in charge of the ‘revival’, was removed in March 2023. You can find further details and a perspective on the matter here.